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INTRODUCTION
The inability of the Iranian agriculture to meet the rapidly expanding re­
quirements of food during the decade of the seventies was a source of acute em- 
barassment to the government. On the subject of agrarian policies, the regime 
was especially vulnerable to criticism because the rising dependencee on food 
imports and continuous rural migration were perceived as evidence of a funda­
mental failure of the land reform. The extreme opponents of the regime charged 
the Shah with having deliberately ruined the country’s agriculture in the int 
est of foreign powers, and the issue of agricultural policies became a veritable 
cause celebre. As a consequence of this vulnerability, researchers were often 
Viewed suspiciously by the bureaucracy; open and substantive discussions of ru­
ne The task of agricultural researchers was further compli- ral affairs were rare. Ttie taste or
cated by the relative scarcity of accurate data. -------
With the advent of the Revolution and increased interest in Iranian affairs, 
there has been an upsurge in the amount of literature on agricultural policies. 
Much of the writings has been in the context of the supposed causes of the kevo- 
lution. However, discussions of agricultural affairs have often been marred by 
an insufficient familiarity with the Iranian agricultural setting, deficient 
statistics, ideological considerations, and incessant attempts, evidence not
withstanding, to make the facts fit a preconceived pattern.
The purpose of this paper is to describe the Iranian land reform, the effect 
of rising petroleum income on the agricultural sector, and the general agricul­
tural policies during the post land reform era and the onset of the Re 
ln 1978. Much of the emphasis will be on land reform because of the extreme 
importance of the subject, but also because any meaningful analysis
1
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of the Iranian agricultural policy during this period must be in the context of 
the land reform. The paper also aims to dispel some of the widely held miscon­
ceptions on the land reform, rural unemployment and poverty and the issues of
agricultural prices and protection. It will be seen that widely diffused and 
commonly held views like —  '
The Shah's agrarian reforms benefited only a mi- 
nority of the peasants, who, in any case, were soon
i n d u s t r i a l i z e d ? ° m1panles enS ^ d  in large-scale industrialized agriculture. The massive importing of
agricultural goods, especially wheat from the United
States—-coupled with the absence or inadequacy of
protective tariffs— contributed to the ruin of count- 
ess small farmers, aggravated rural unemployment, 
and swelled the migration to the cities.
have no foundation in facts.!/ Perpetuation of these serves to mislead
future historians and obscure the valuable lessons from Iran's experience.
Contrary to widely held impressions, the vast majority of the Iranian peas­
antry received land under the reform. Indeed, land reform brought about funda­
mental changes to the country's agriculture. The change was not confined to am 
alteration in the structure and meaning of landownership; the reforms changed a 
traditional and widespread system of communal production to a pattern of small, 
individualistic units. The problem was not, as is often claimed, that the land 
not sufficiently radical," meaning the coverage was not sufficiently 
widespread. Indeed, given the level of intensity, and the prolonged period of 
government sloganeering prior to and during the land reform, the old system was 
irrevocably transformed. Given the levels of expectations raised by the
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publicity, no government could have stopped short of implementing a comprehen­
sive land reform; in practice, the government became prisoner of its own rhetor 
ic. Land reform was launched despite insufficient insight into the workings of 
the traditional system, and a severe scarcity of data on the actual structure of 
landownership• It will be seen that land reform demolished the ancient system 
of communal farming, one that appeared to be suited to the country's agricul­
tural resource endowments. In addition, the administrative machinery proved in­
capable of dealing with the exigencies created by the land reform, notably the 
administration of the rural cooperatives, and the issue of property title deeds. 
Thus, given the failings of the country's bureaucratic apparatus, the land
reform proved to be excessively radical.
A frequent claim has been that the Iranian Revolution had its origins in the
failure of the land reform to create a classless rural society. The regime's 
failure to give land to a sizeable minority of rural inhabitants, and the 
resulting inequitable and uneven land distribution created a substantial body of 
impoverished and dispossessed persons, and thereby sowed the seeds of revolu­
tion. It will be argued that the inclusion of the so-called landless laborers 
in the land reform did not constitute a long-term solution to the problems of 
rural poverty. Moreover, this thesis is to be appraised in view of 
labor shortages and rapidly rising urban and rural wages during the years 
preceeding the Revolution. Indeed, perhaps nowhere were the labor shortages 
felt more strongly than in the agricultural sector. An indication of the extent 
of the labor scarcities was the absorption of a large number of unskilled 
foreign workers in the Iranian economy. Furthermore, it is interesting 
that although large farms were broken up after the Revolution, all attempts to
land reform, that is, the creation of a classless rural society,carry out a new
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have been unsuccessful.
Shortly after the completion of land reform, Iranian agriculture was faced 
lossal challenge as well as tangible opportunities caused by the rise 
in petroleum revenues. The increase in urban employment opportunities attracted 
rural labor in great numbers. In general, the importance of the non- 
agricultural employment opportunities in the mural areas have been neglected in 
the current writings. In fact, demand for the products of the rural industries 
harply during the long economic boom. In many regions, rural 
industries became a serious competitor for the dwindling supply of rural labor. 
Agricultural costs were further affected by the price of land, distortions in 
the land market, and the Inability of the government to solve the issue of deeds 
and ownership titles. The uncertainty concerning the ownership of land was an 
important factor in the inability of agriculture to attract sufficient capital,
reduced the pace of mechanization at a time of rapidly rising labor costs, and 
hindered farm consolidation.
With the continuous and rapidly rising population and per capita income, 
there was a substantial increase in the demand for agricultural products. Since 
Iran had been mainly self-sufficient in food, the inability of domestic output 
to meet the expanding requirements, and the consequent rise in imports, gave 
rise to consternation and criticism. Issues of agricultural Imports, prices and 
protection will be the subject of the final part of the paper. There Is some 
evidence of a stagnant agriculture after land reforms. Concerning agricultural 
protection, the government had to balance the conflicting claims of the produ­
cers, urban consumers, and fiscal necessities. In practice, the government's 
ability to reverse the declining terms of trade for farm products by means of
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tariffs, price policy and the exchange rate was limited. At a time of galloping 
inflation, the government ability to further raise food costs was severely re­
stricted. The paper will end with a discussion of government investment in the 
agribusiness concerns, provision of government supplied capital to the agricul­
tural sector, and the failure of the rural cooperatives to serve as an adequate
channel for subsidized capital.
This paper is not intended to be a critique of land reform. One can only 
speculate on the performance of the Iranian agriculture in the absence 
reform during the petroleum boom. Moreover, as demonstrated by the expansion of 
the rural industries, the rise in imports of agricultural products were in part 
caused by changing comparative advantage. Finally, given the present 
with agrarian reform in some of the developing countries, notably El Salvador, 
the experience of the Iranian land reform has some relevance. In addition, some 
of the remaining issues are pertinent to some of the petroleum exporting 
countries with a substantial agricultural base.
Manv of the statistics used in this paper are based on the Iranian solar 
calendar year which starts on March 21. For example, the year correspo
to March 21, 1972 until March 20, 1973. It will be written as 1972/73.
Throughout the text, frequent re fe re n ce  will be made to the ^ ^ f f o r
and its ownership. Traditionally, given the acarc“J 5fe/ ^ e^ ^ ^ e" elor t ed
T i L T i u ■
* i r s . :  L 2 i . t w  U .  e „ . r  <*
h o w s ’ In the text, it alludes to a territorial unit cultivated and exploited
h y £  inhabitants the village. The ownership of a v i l l a g e ^  one or more
individuals meant the right to receive a portion the obligations.
produced by the residents in return for certain duties and obligatio
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LAND REFORM AND THE FARM STRUCTURE
By the early 1950's, four categories of landholdings were dlscernable. 
First, there were large owners possessing one or more villages; included in this 
group were the crown lands, the endowed lands (vaghf) administered by religious 
bodies, and the holdings of individual landowners. Secondly, there were the 
medium and small landowners holding a fraction of one or more villages (khordem- 
alek). Thirdly, there were independent peasant operators scattered throughout 
the country. Lastly, there were a relatively small number of commercial farms, 
in particular, in the Mazandaran and Gorgan regions. 2/ Reliable figures on 
the structure of landownership during this period do not exist; one can only 
draw inferences from the post land reform statistics. 3/
Land reform was launched in early 1962 with the intention of limiting pri­
vate ownership of agricultural resources, transferring land to tenant farmers, 
and eradicating the widespread practice.of sharecropping. It consisted of com­
pulsory purchase of land from the owners and subsequent transfer to the culti­
vating tenants and sharecroppers. The sale of land to tenants was not new; in 
1932/33 the state lands in the provinces of Slstan and Lorestan were distributed 
among the tenants. 4/ The practice continued after the Second World War when 
crown lands were sold by the Pahlavi Foundation during, the fifties and:the six­
ties. About 2000 Villages and farms were sold to the farmers. 5/
Given the dearth of statistics on the structure of landownership, it was not 
possible to verify or refute some of the estimates. The Minister of Agriculture 
declared in 1962 that 15,000 villages were owned by landlords possessing more 
than five villages. Government sources states that 400 to 500 landowners owned
57 percent of all the villages.6/ Such claims were highly exaggerated.
Post land reform figures indicate about one quarter of the villages were owned 
by landlords possessing more than one village. Several factors militated 
against the accumulation of wealth in the form of land. The widespread practice 
of polygamy and the resulting myriad of descendants, the absence of primogeni 
ture under Islamic laws, the discontinuation of Tuyul, the practice of faming 
out taxes and the grant of land by the Royal Court to favorite individuals, and 
repeated political upheavals during the twentieth century are to be noted. In 
addition, the growing urban economies, and the poor and unreliable road condi­
tions throughout the country considerably reduced the attraction of large 
accumulations*
The land reform was carried out in three phases, and was officially
completed in 1972/73. Since there were no reliable statistics on land ownership, 
each subsequent phase was in part an attempt to redress the perceived 
shortcomings of the previous stage. Phase One dealt with owners possessing more 
than one village; each owner was allowed one village of choice or its. 
equivalent, and the remaining villages were sold to the government which then 
transferred the property rights to the tenants. Lands worked by machinery and 
wage labor as well as orchards, groves, tea plantations and vineyards were 
exempted from distribution. The number of the so-called mechanized units was 
relatively small since in 1960, it was estimated that only ten percent of all 
the agricultural units used mechanical ploughing, of which 95 percent relied on 
tractor rentals and custom ploughing. In addition, a sizable proportion of the 
stock of agricultural machinery was concentrated in the provinces of Gorgan and 
Mazandaran.Z/ Concerning orchards, groves, vineyards and plantations, the 
land reform law declared the land to be the property of the landlord. However, 
in conformity with the Persian tradition, it declared the roots, plants and the
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trees to be the property of the tenants. In practice, since the tenants re­
tained possession, the only practical limitation on their ownership was the ina^  
bility to legally sell the property without the consent of the landlord.
There are varying estimates on the number of villages and farm families 
affected by the first Phase; according to government sources 13,904 villages 
were eligible for purchase and distribution. There is some disagreement on the 
number divided among the cultivators; the 1966 Iran Almanac cited 12,875 
villages. The Ministry of Rural Affairs and Cooperatives stated 16,426 villages 
were distributed between 781,322 families under Phase One.£/ It appears 
that a little over one quarter of the villages were owned by landowners owning
more than one village and that the actual ownership of land was less concentra-
ted than it was commonly believed.jV
The value of the lands were set at ten times the amount of annual tax paid 
by the owner; landlords were to be compensated in 15 yearly installments at six 
p cent rate of interest. The cultivators were to repay the government in 15 
installments, and documents were to remain as collateral in the custody of the 
Cooperative Bank. According to the pamphlet published by the Land Reform Orga­
nization, the 8707 villages were valued at 5,115, 417, 590 rials ($72.5 mil­
lion). The first installment paid to the landlords was 562,429,016 rials 
($7.89 million). The average value of a village was set at 587,506 rials 
($8330), payable over 15 years at a six percent rate of interest. In reality, 
while the landowners were treated harshly, the cost borne by peasants was nomi­
nal. Moreover, as the cultivators fell behind in their annual payments, the 
Central Bank simply funded the deficit.10/
The Second Phase was launched in 1963 and was comprehensive in scope. Every 
landlord was given one of several options on land not taken in Phase One:
91) sell the land to the peasant cultivators directly, or to the government on 
terms equal to those of Phase One; 2) divide the land with the cultivators 
according to existing crop shares; 3) rent the land to cultivators for thirty 
years; 4) set up joint stock companies with the cultivators; 5) purchase the 
tenants cultivation rights. Tenants on endowed lands were given ninety-nine 
year leases•
According to the Ministry of Information 11/, a total of 2,466,292 fami­
lies benefited from Phase Two. The breakdown was as follows: 210,017 land­
lords leased their land to 1,151,071 cultivators; 21,952 owners set up joint 
stock units with 132,677 tenants; 17,663 landlords divided the land with 154,104 
tenants; 7,821 landlords purchased the cultivation rights of 16,875 tenants; 
3,472 landlords sold their lands to 56,205 tenants; 10,466 endowed properties 
were leased to 163,491 cultivators mostly for 99 years. Lastly, it is stated 
that 782,181 "landowners" became farmers. The last item is based on a missp 
fication of the word "landowner," and a rich source of confusion. Disregarding 
the 782,181 "landowners" and 16,875 peasants who sold their cultivation rights, 
a total of 1,657,548 peasant households benefitted under Phase Two. The third 
and final phase was introduced in 1968. It stipulated that all lands rented or 
operated as joint stock units were to be sold to the peasants. Phase Three was
officially completed in 1972/73.
It appears that some 2.4 million peasants received land under the three pha­
ses of the reforms. However, the figure underestimates the numbers involved.
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There is considerable variation in the assessment of the number of land recipi­
ents under the reforms. Writing in 1968, Keddie estimated that 14 to 15 percent 
of the peasants received land. Weinbaum stated that 800,000 families benefit- 
fed; Abrahamian, citing other sources, stated 1.638 million peasant households 
received land. Hooglund believes, following extensive study of government pub­
lications, that nearly 2 million farmers received land. Amuzegar implies close 
to 3 million producers benefited from the land reform. The World Bank stated 
the number of beneficiaries were in excess of 3 million cultivators.W
According to official figures, the number of beneficiaries under all the phases 
was 3 f247,614 families■
Under the reform program, membership in a rural cooperative was made manda­
tory for those receiving land. Therefore, the cooperative membership figures 
should give an indication of the numbers affected. In 1972/73, the year the 
land reforms were officially completed, 2.065 million farmers belonged to the 
cooperatives, indicating that at least 2 million producers became land­
holders • ! ! /  However, because of limited government resources and slowness 
in setting up cooperatives, the membership clause was often waive d . W  
Therefore, the figure of 2 million is an underestimate. Additional insight is 
gained by an examination of the cooperative membership figures after the comple­
tion of the land reform. .Between 1972/73 and 1977/78, membership of the cooper­
atives expanded by exactly 200,000 producers per year (Table I,), and stood at 
3.001 million members in 1977/78. According to the Fifth Development Plan tar­
gets, the plan aimed at extending the coverage of the cooperatives to 85 percent 
of the villages by 1977/78. Evidently, at least one-third of the producers were 
not covered by the cooperatives when the land reforms were completed. In view 
of the cooperative membership numbers, the World Bank and Amuzegar’s estimates
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TABLE I. MEMBERSHIP OF RURAL COOPERATIVES 
1964/64 - 1977/78
Membership (000)
1963/64 571
1964/65 668
1965/66 791
1966/67 961
1967/68 1104
1968/69 1278
1969/70 1430
1970/71 1606
1971/72 1723
1972/73 2065
1973/74 2263
1974/75 2488
1975/76 2685
1976/77 2868
1977/78 3001
SOURCE: Ministry of Rural Affairs and Cooperatives, Rural Cooperatives in
Iran, Research Group No. 33, Teheran 1971.
The Central Bank of Iran, Annual Reports, 1973/74 - 1978/79.
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of nearly 3 million beneficiaries appear to be accurate. Indeed, Amuzegar
stated 2.5 million producers were affected by the second and third phases of the 
land reform.
Using the 1972/73 Agricultural Statistics published by the Iran Statistical
Center (^ arkaz~e~Amar-e iran) and estimates of the Agricultural and Rural Advi­
sory Mission of the World Bank, Price estimated the structure of landholdings 
and output shares in terms of value for 1972 (Table 2). 15/ The farm struc_
ture described by Price consisted of 2.533 million farms with an average size of 
six hectares. There were 7,000 units larger than 100 hectares, averaging 258 
hectares. Next, there were 10,000 farms between 51 and 100 hectares, and aver­
aged 70 hectares. These two categories occupied 16 percent of the farm area.
At the lower end of the scale, there were 1.688 million farms with less than 
five hectares, with an average area of just one hectare, occupying 17 percent of 
the land. In terms of land area, by far the most important group consisted of 
farms of 11 to 50 hectares, with an average of 17.5 hectares, and occupied 46 
percent of the land. The second most important group in terms of land area were 
farms of six to ten hectares, averaging 7.3 hectares and occupying 21 percent of 
the farm area. The latter two groups consisted of 828,000 farms, and repre­
sented one-third of the farm families and two-thirds of the agricultural lands. 
Overall, 34 percent of farm families owned 83 percent of the land, and con­
versely, 66 percent owned 17 percent of the farm area. However, Table 2 does 
not describe the country's farm structure since at least 500,000 producers are 
unaccounted for. It is reasonable to infer that the table portrays the results 
of the second and third phases of the land reform, especially in view of the 
fact that some 17,000 landlords opted for the division of land, and in the table 
there are the same number of farm units larger than 51 hectares; furthermore,
13
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the mechanized units exempted under the first phase of the land reform are not 
reflected in the table.
A more realistic view of the farm structure is obtained if the 781,000 land 
recipients under Phase One are also included. It should be noted that under the 
first phase, with the exception of a few mechanized units, all the village lands 
were divided between the cultivators. Consequently, the farm structure created 
by the land reforms was much less concentrated than indicated by Price.16/ 
Although the land area covered by 17,000 farms larger than 51 hectares repre­
sented no more than 16 percent of farmlands affected by Phase Two, a potentially 
explosive situation was created. In approximately 17,000 villages the cultivat­
ing peasants had less land to work with than previously, and many had to share 
the village irrigation sources with their former landlords. The disputes over 
water rights and boundaries were frequent before the Revolution. Furthermore, 
it was difficult to expect peasant cultivators in a village to accept part-own­
ership of land and water resources while the surrounding hamlets were fully 
owned by the local villagers.17/
Table 2 is indicative of the nature of the farm problem, namely, that some 
15.3 million hectares of farmland are worked by 2.533 million farm units; the 
main problem is one of rural overpopulation. A drastic redistribution of land 
will not alter the overall farm average size of six hectares. The 17,000 farms 
larger than 51 hectares occupied 2.51 million hectares; if this land had been 
added to the holdings of 1.688 million farms under five hectares, this group's 
average would have doubled to 3.2 hectares. It is frequently stated that seven 
hectares is the minimum needed to support a family of five with basic subsist­
ence needs.18/ However, given the geographic and climatic variations in- 
Iran, extreme care should be exercised in the use of overall average figures.
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It is of interest to note that although large farms accounted for 12 percent 
of the land, they produced only 6 percent of output. The share of output of me­
dium sized farms, defined as 11 to 100 hectares, was 36 percent, although their 
land share was 50 percent. Small farms, defined as less than 10 hectares, pro 
duced 41 percent of gross agricultural output from 38 percent of the land. The 
remaining 17 percent of output was produced by pastoralists and "other rural 
people not owning land." In terms of marketed surplus, that is domestic supply 
of food for the non-farm population, the contribution of the small farms was 19 
percent and the main bulk was produced by the large and medium sized farms. In 
particular, this group produced much of the marketed output of grains, and the 
small farmers concentrated more on production of higher valued and more 
labor intensive cash crops.
Small farms are seen to be more productive in terms of output per unit of 
land not because small peasant proprietorships are optimal for Iranian condi­
tions, or because peasant farms were better managed. The reason is that small 
farms are generally located on better soil. Regional examples are numerous and 
a few will be given. The rice-producing areas of the Caspian litoral, one of 
the most productive agricultural regions of the country, are overwhelmingly dom­
inated by small units; generally, a single hectare of rice-land is sufficient to 
provide a family of five with subsistence needs as well as cash income. Other 
examples include the agricultural regions of Northern Khorassan, Isfahan, and 
West Azarbaijan. This fact has a direct bearing on any future agricultural pol­
icy; any land redistribution per se is unlikely to increase substantially the 
total supply of food to the urban sector. Historically, the most productive 
lands have been the most densely settled and the most intensively worked. This 
usually meant lands with the best water resources. With the advent of land
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reform and the transfer of land to the cultivators, this tendency was unalt­
ered.
According to Table 2, there were 790,000 rural families classified as not 
owning land. This corresponded to 23 percent of the rural families, and 
one third of rural families owning land. It is believed that before the land 
reforms 40 percent of the rural households were "landless, that is, without 
regular cultivation rights on the landlord's estates. A detailed study of an 
Iranian village in 1963 showed 40 percent of the village families were landless 
and were known as khoshneshin, a common description of those without cultivation 
rights.20/ According to a 1960 sample survey of Iranian agriculture, 1.3 
million households were without regular cultivation rights, and 1.9 million had 
regular cultivation privileges; again indicating 40 percent of households were 
landless.^A/ The khoshneshin class were not included in the land reform pro­
gram and received no land. With the social and economic changes brought about 
by the land reforms substantial numbers of landless families were forced to mi­
grate to the urban areas. Bartsch estimated that between 1956 and 1966 rural 
population grew at an average of 1.96 percent per year, while the urban popula­
tion expanded at 4.52 percent annually.22/ A tentative comparison of the 
results of the 1960 Agricultural Sample Survey with Table 2 indicates that be­
tween 1960 and 1972/73, rural population increased at 1.35 percent. Consequent­
ly, the pace of rural migration quickened during the second half of the 1960's. 
Moreover, according to the 1976 census, between 1966 and 1976, rural population
increased from 15.3 to 16 million, while total population increased by one 
third.
A frequent criticism of the land reforms was the failure to give land to the 
landless. It is evident, in the light of the above, that inclusion of an
17
additional one million families in the land reform would not have solved the 
problem of poverty and underemployment in the rural areas. It was evident dur­
ing the first part of the Seventies that many farms were becoming submarginal 
that is, they were too small to provide the owners with an adequate per capita 
income. It was believed some improvement in income was possible through greater 
supply of irrigation water and better cultivation practices; but the scope was 
limited *.23/
Traditionally, in regions of water scarcity, in other words much of the 
country, sharecropping peasants were organized into production teams commonly 
known as boneh. In areas with plentiful water like the Caspian litoral and 
parts of western Iran, rents were often fixed and were paid in cash as well as 
in kind; in these regions an individualistic mode of production was the dominant 
norm. Bonehs were dominant in the central, eastern, and southern parts of the 
country. Each village was divided into several bonehs; each team cultivated a
given area of land with a given number of peasants
The actual number of bonehs in a village was determined by the availability
and the frequency of irrigation water. Total supply depended on the number of 
irrigation sources available; frequency of supply was determined by the pro rata 
distribution of the water. A specific number of days was known as the madar; a 
madar of ten, for example, signified division of water into ten daily shares; 
likewise, a madar of six indicated six daily divisions. The number of bonehs in 
a village corresponded to the irrigation madar, that is each boneh received 
twenty-four hours of water in a given number of days. Usually, depending on 
climatic and soil conditions, each ghanat sustained between six and twelve bon- 
p.hs .25/ Villages with large numbers of bonehs had numerous irrigation
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sources.
Given the frequency of water availability, the area that could be planted in 
a season was determined by the rate of flow (keshesh) of the water and was 
defined in terms of pairs of oxen (joft). A "pair" corresponded to an area that 
could be ploughed and cultivated by a pair of oxen. Each boneh planted several 
pairs; the actual area planted depended on the supply of water; although land 
units were defined in terms of oxen, it was actually the amount of water that 
was the determinant.26/ Village lands were classified into various 
categories, usually designated as good, moderate and least desireable; within 
each classification, fields were divided into equal sizes and lots were drawn 
between the bonehs. Consequently, each boneh planted several fields, the number 
of which was determined by the number of soil classes.
The labor requirements per boneh were determined by the area cultivated. In
practice, membership corresponded to the number of pairs of oxen; for example, a 
three pair" boneh had usually six members. The main conditions for membership 
were hereditary cultivation rights (nasagh), full-time residence in the village, 
and the agreement of the landlord.27/ The composltlon of boneh wag
hierarchical and seniority was based on ownership of plough animals and
appointment by the landlord. Each member's share of the crop was based on the 
position in the hierarchy.
There were two distinct types of boneh. The first was commonly known as 
arbab-rayati boneh (landlord-peasant); the second was commonly referred to as a
— Yba”dl I" the first category, the landlord exerted direct control over
the affairs of the boneh, and was responsible for the provision of plough ani­
mals and seeds, in addition to land and water. In the second, others acquired 
or gained the right to supply all or a fraction of the animal power required by 
the boneh. As a general rule, the arbab-rayati boneh were more common in
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villages where the landlords resided or had easy access to animal power.28/
The landlord's share of the crop was dependent on the type of boneh; in the ar- 
bab-rayati case, since the landlord provided land, water, animal power and seed, 
he obtained sixty to seventy percent of the crop. In the gavbandi case, the 
gavbands obtained a quarter of the crop, having provided seed and oxen, and the 
landlord's share was between 40 and 50 percent. The cultivators' share was 
about one quarter and since the gavbands also worked as cultivators, their real 
share was higher. It should be noted, however, that these were nominal shares, 
and the actual system was more complicated. There were numerous other claimants 
on the output, including the field guards (dashtbans), carpenters, bath attend­
ants, and the mullahi they obtained a fixed allowance before the division of the 
crop. Safinejad describes in detail some of the traditional and widespread
29 /practices used by the peasants to augment their share.„
The distinction between the two types of boneTxs became crucial during the 
land reform. The division of land between the villagers was based on the boneh 
hierarchy, and the division of crops between cultivators, including the gavb­
ands. Consequently, in villages where the bonehs were based on the arbab-rayati 
system, the division of land was relatively equal; in the other villages, land 
distribution was unequal. Given the variation in land qualities and desirabil­
ity, such as proximity to an irrigation source, each cultivator received land 
parcels in several locations.
Bonehs were an integral part of a hierarchical and traditional society. 
However, the system was suited to the country's agricultural resource endow­
ments, especially the shortage of irrigation water; it facilitated efficient use 
of water and prevented the excessive fragmentation of the fields which would
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have been the result of Islamic inheritance laws.-5°/ Safinejad laments the 
passing away of bonehs after the land reform. With some exceptions, the bonehs 
gradually disintegrated after the land reform. Sharecropping, on the other hand, 
survived In scattered parts of the country. Recently, exaggerated and erroneous 
claims of the extent and the nature of sharecropping have been made. In this 
respect, It Is Important to distinguish between two distinct types of sharecrop­
ping. Institutional sharecropping, whereby the peasants worked on the land­
lords' estates on a regular basis for a share of the output, was rare. Indeed, 
not more than a single case of sharecropping is noted in Safinejad. Likewise, 
Nowshirvani's extensive study of agricultural mechanization in Iran noted a 
single incidence of sharecropping.31/ The practice 0f sharecropping between 
the cultivators who had received land under the land reforms was more common.
The present author discovered numerous cases of elderly farmers whose offspring 
had left the farm choosing to rent their land to other farmers or landless work­
ers on a sharecropping basis. It will be noted below that this phenomenon was 
caused in part by the distortion in the price of farmlands.32/
The law enabling the government to set up the so-called farm corporations 
was enacted during the land reforms. Essentially, the measure was intended to 
promote and increase farm mechanization, facilitate farm consolidation, and help 
the peasant population to achieve greater prosperity. In practice, several ad­
joining villages in selected regions were formed into a corporation and the gov­
ernment assumed the management of each unit. In exchange for the property 
rights, the peasant proprietors were given shares in the corporation. The ex­
change of property rights for shares was not a novelty since under the bonehs 
each member had a share in the output of the unit.ll/
In 1976/77, there were 89 farm corporations with some 33,000 households,
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and covering some 130,000 hectares. The numbers increased to 94 in 1977/78, the 
year before the Revolution. In all, the farm corporations included 850 vil­
lages >21/ Although the farm corporations covered a very small fraction of 
the agricultural units, the experiment amply illustrated the shortcomings of the 
bureaucratic machinery in the conduct of agricultural affairs. The farm corpor­
ations were meant to serve as a channel to direct subsidized government cap­
ital and modern management into traditional agriculture. In practice, they 
were often starved of capital, and frequently the government-supplied managers 
were ill-prepared to tackle some of the problems associated with the management 
of farms consisting of several thousand hectares. Overall, the experiment was 
not a happy one. The farm corporations were dissolved shortly after the 
Revolution.
The case of the four farm corporations in the southern part of the province 
of West Azerbaijan illustrates the point. Prom the point of view of water and 
land resources, three of the corporations were extremely well-endowed. They 
were situated downstream from the Shahpur I dam located on the Zarin-run River 
near the city of Mehabad.35/ However, in 1978 the author found the amount 
of available farm machinery woefully inadequate for the large tracts of avail­
able and fully irrigated land. In addition, all the managers complained of in­
adequate personnel and maintenance facilities. One spoke of lengthy delays in 
the construction of feeder canals and the associated land levelling.
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, PETROLEUM INCOME AND AGRICULTURE
The Iranian economy began to grow rapidly during the second half of the 
sixties. The growth was made possible by the increasing petroleum income and 
was sustained until the application of fiscal and monetary brakes in 1976/77.
The early years of the boom were characterized by relative price stability. By 
the early 1970's, there were growing inflationary pressures, and with the sudden 
rise in the price of oil in 1973/74 and the associated increase in government 
expenditures, inflation became a serious problem. One of the most conspicuous 
results of the economic boom was the inflation in the price of land.
During this period, land speculation became an easy way to acquire wealth 
and a secure hedge against inflation. In addition, the market for agricultural 
land had been greatly distorted by the land reform, and legislation concerning 
the sale of farmlands. Recipients of land under the land reforms were barred 
from the sale of farmlands until the completion of payment to the Agricultural 
Cooperative Bank. The vast majority of those who had completed the payments and 
whose lands were not bound to the Bank, were without proper legal deeds. Tradi­
tionally, property deeds were usually issued to landlords; however, substantial 
numbers of landholders were without the proper deeds because of past unresolved 
conflicts concerning village property rights. With the advent of land reform, 
the division of land between several million farmers, and the accompanying frag­
mentation of farmlands, the issue became extremely complicated. The task of 
surveying the fragmented plots and issuing deeds to several million farmers was 
quite beyond the capability of a centralized and often slow-moving bureaucracy, 
especially the Ministry of Justice. Consequently, the vast majority of farmers 
were without deeds establishing ownership.
23
This resulted in a dual market in farmlands and distortion in land prices. 
Farmers not possessing deeds found it difficult to dispose of their lands at 
alistic prices since buyers were reluctant to invest in properties lacking the 
necessary papers. Lands with the legal documents were sought after and were at 
a premium. In effect, farmland prices were distorted since they did not corre­
spond entirely to value in agricultural use. The unsatisfactory state of af­
fairs in the land market hindered farm consolidation into more economical units, 
and ruled out meaningful mechanization in much of the country1s agriculture.
The distortion in the land market, and the uncertainty concerning legal titles, 
were important factors in the failure of agriculture to attract sufficient 
amounts of outside capital and commercial credit. It can also explain in part 
the continued practice of sharecropping, especially among the small and medium­
sized farmers. As a growing number of farms became submarginal, younger members 
of the farm families left the farm, and the older generation was obliged to hire 
wage labor, or to resort to sharecropping. Also, those farmers who left farming 
and obtained urban employment found it advantageous to rent their land on a 
sharecropping basis.
Rural migration had been underway for several decades, and had provided
much of the labor requirements of the growing urban economy. After the land re­
forms substantial numbers of landless families left the countryside and sought a 
living in the towns. With rapid economic growth from the second half of the 
sixties, there was a marked improvement in employment opportunities outside ag 
riculture, drawing both the landless as well as the "non-wage family" agricul­
tural workers. The rural migration was not confined to those seeking jobs; the 
wealthy peasant cultivators, those who had been favored by land reform, were
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among those taking up residence in towns in order to take advantage of better 
living conditions and greater business opportunities. However, despite the 
influx of workers into towns, substantial labor shortages were developing in the 
urban construction industry. The Central Bank index of unskilled urban 
construction wages increased from 65.0 in 1972/73 to 273.2 in 1977/78 (1974/75 » 
100), more than a fourfold rise in as many years (table 3). The latter index is 
especially important because of the close relationship between unskilled urban 
construction wages and agricultural wages. Because of the winter cold, the 
construction industry in Iran is seasonal, with the peak period of activities 
occurring between spring and fall seasons. Many of the construction workers 
were actually seasonal migrants, who were drawn by the high construction wages, 
hence rural wages closely followed construction wages. The coincidence of
seasonal activities in the two sectors created a double pressure on both urban 
and rural wages.
Traditionally, the making of bricks was concentrated around the cities.
With expanding urban regions and rising land values, stricter zoning regula­
tions, and most important, improved road conditions, there was a relocation of 
brick making to the rural areas. The making of bricks is a labor intensive 
activity with simple raw materials consisting of clay, water, and fuel. Given 
relatively cheap transportation and the booming demand for bricks, some of the 
producing areas were found at considerable distances from urban areas. By the 
mid-1970's, brick making was largely manned by migrant workers from Afghan- 
xstan.—  Employment of Afghan workers was not confined to non-agricultural
activities. A 1976 sample of sugarbeet farmers in Neishabur region of Khorassan 
noted employment of Afghan migrant workers.37/
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Table 3
INDEX OF UNSKILLED URBAN CONSTRUCTION WAGES, 1966/67 - 1977/78
1974/75 =100
Year Index
1966/67 35.0 '
1967/68 37.1
1968/69 43.4
1969/70 51.9
1970/71 54.3
1971/72 55.4
1972/73 65.0
1973/74 75.8
1974/75 100.0
1975/76 151.4
1976/77 204.3
1977/78 273.2
SOURCE: Central Bank of Iran, Annual Reports.
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Carpet weaving is one of the oldest and by far the most important rural 
industry in terms of employment and income generation. Carpets are made 
throughout Iran. Traditionally, carpet weaving provided employment during win­
ter months when little agricultural activity takes place. With little capital 
requirements, it is suited to household production. The carpet industry had 
been expanding at least since 1956.38/ Comparing the 1966 census with that 
of 1956, Bartsch noted that the total number of full-time carpet weavers nation­
wide increased from 186,000 to 425,000. Of the increase of 239,000, a total of 
123,000 were estimated to have taken place in rural areas, and 116,000 in urban 
areas . ^ 2 /
Demand for Persian carpets is determined by export as well as domestic 
demand. Export demand is primarily determined by taste factors and fashions in 
industrialized countries and the industry is subject to cyclical fluctuations. 
Internal demand is determined by domestic economic conditions. The rapid expan­
sion of the carpet making industry between 1956 and 1966 indicates the import­
ance of exports. The second half of the fifties were booming years and were 
followed by a major political crisis and a severe economic recession during the 
first half of the sixties. Domestic demand for carpets, consequently, was slug­
gish during most of this period. Carpet weaving experienced an unprecedented 
boom during the seventies. A strong export demand coincided with rapidly rising 
domestic demand causing marked increases in carpet prices .4°/ Carpet weav­
ing became a serious competitor for rural labor.
The findings of a 1976 farm sample in the agricultural region of Neishabur, 
cited above, are illustrative. The study indicated the importance of carpet 
weaving as a source of employment and income in the rural areas. The stratified 
sample consisted of 104 sugarbeet farmers. Of these, 28 farmers owned and
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operated a carpet workshop on their premises. Taking the small farmers, the 
study estimated that between 30 and 40 percent produced carpets, using both fam­
ily and wage labor .AL'
During the summer of 1976 a weaver in his or her late teens earned between 
400 and 500 rials per day; a skillful weaver commanded up to 700 rials. All
large commercial farmers roundly condemned carpet weaving as a social evil 
curtailed by government legislation. They stressed the long term health hazards 
and the foregone educational opportunities caused by weaving, not to mention the 
reduction in the supply of agricultural labor during the summer months and the
resulting higher wages. Given the high and expanding demand for rugs during 
this period, weaving provided a lucrative and year-round source of employment 
for farm people. Apart from needing little capital requirements, there were few 
market risks involved; the rug merchant who -commissioned" the rugs provided the 
basic raw materials, design specifications, and cash advances, and purchased the 
finished products at a specified price. The short-run opportunity cost of weav­
ing was income from work on the family farm or as agricultural wage laborer;
given the harsh work conditions and the less lucrative returns from farming, it
42/was not surprising that carpet weaving attracted so many persons
this case, some of the shortfalls in the availability of farm labor were met by 
the Afghan migrant workers.
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AGRICULTURAL IMPORTS AND PROTECTION
Before the decade of the 1960's, Iran was self-sufficient in food. The 
main exceptions were tea, sugar and vegetable oils. Agricultural imports regis- 
some rise during the latter decade, but the volumes were small in relation
to total domestic production and use. There was a substantial increase in the 
import of grains and animal products during the 1970's.
The marked rise in grain imports began in 1971/72 (Table 4). Between 
1962/63 and 1970/71, Iran’s wheat imports had averaged 180,000 tons per year.
The comparable figure for the year's 1971/72 to 1977/78 was 987,000 tons or more 
than a fivefold increase. More spectacular was the increase in rice imports; 
yearly rice imports averaged 15,000 tons during the sixties and 206,000 tons 
during the seventies. In 1977/78 nearly 600,000 tons of rice were imported, 
representing a third of domestic consumption. Animal feed grains showed a simi­
lar trend. Imports of barley were practically nil before 1971/72; they had 
reached 333,000 tons by early 1978. The same holds with corn. It should be 
noted that very little corn can be grown domestically as animal feed, and nearly 
all the requirements have to be imported.
The increase in imports was not confined to food and feed grains. In 
1977/78 Iran's imports of red and white meat were about 130,000 tons, increasing 
to over 150,000 tons in 1978/79 despite the political upheavals and the pro­
longed shutdown of the country’s ports. The same rapid rate of increase was 
seen in the case of dairy products. In 1976/77, 17,000 tons of eggs and 50,000 
tons of butter and cheese were imported. The respective figures for the follow- 
ing year were 27,000 and 67,000 tons.£3/
With the exception of a few selected cash crops, reliable statistics on 
output of farm products are scarce. Using population, per capita consumption, 
and import figures, one can arrive at fairly reliable estimates. Traditionally, 
Iran has had one of the highest per capita consumption of wheat in the world.
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TABLE 4
IMPORTS OF GRAIN, 1962/63 - 1977/78 (000 ton?2
1962/63
1963/64
1964/65
1965/66
1966/67
1967/68
1968/69
1969/70
1970/71
1971/72
1972/73
1973/74
1974/75
1975/76
1976/77
1977/78
Wheat
34.9 19.2
56.2 A
495.5 13.1
198.1 47.8
212.2 13.4
61.8 1 0 . 1
534.6 24.3
.4 1.8
22.6 5.6
993.3 60.4
711.3 91.8
784.8 4.0
1423.9 150.8
1439.6 286.1
405.7 259.7
1159.2 589.8
Barley Corn
1 . 0 A
* A
6.1 5.4
. 1 .5
1.4 A
A 8.9
A 70.5
A . 1
* 11.5
191.8 62.4
23.1 70.3
107.5 130.8
178.4 222.9
203.8 77.9
219.7 213.5
333.8 344.0
a indicates less than 100 tons were imported.
SOURCE: Foreign Trade Statistics of Iran* Annual Reports,
Ministry of Commerce, Iran.
- 30
Average per capita use, including seed and carry-over requirements is close to 
160 Kgs. In 1966/67, the country's population was estimated at 26.04 million. 
Consequently, total wheat requirements were 4.2 million tons. Given imports 
were 212,000 tons, domestic production was close to 4 million tons. By early 
1977/78, population had increased to 36.4 million; assuming an unchanged per 
capita consumption, total wheat requirements were 5.8 million tons, and domestic 
output was close to 4.8 million tons, since imports were averaging one million 
tons per year. Consequently, it appears that the domestic output of wheat grew 
at an average of 1.8 percent which was substantially below the population growth
rate of 3.1 percent. In reality, however, the rate of growth of wheat output
was lower.
The above calculations were made on the assumption that per capita wheat
use remained unchanged at a time of rapidly rising per capita income. Clearly, 
this is not realistic. Being a stable product, it is almost certain that by 
1971 bread had become an inferior good. Consequently, one can rule out rising 
per capita consumption in response to increased income. On the other hand, one 
can expect substitution of other foods for bread in response to rising income. 
Rice is the most likely and direct substitute for bread in the Iranian diet, 
especially imported rice. The varieties of imported rice are considered infer­
ior to those produced domestically. Being substantially cheaper, imported rice 
was consumed mainly by the less affluent members of society, including the rural 
people. Therefore, imported rice can be considered a direct substitute for 
bread. With such a rapid rise in rice imports, substantial decline in wheat 
imports could have been expected. While wheat imports did fall substantially in 
1976/77, they rose to 1.1 million tons in 1977/78 and remained at a similar 
level in the following year. It can be condluded that wheat output grew at less
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than 1.8 percent per year between 1966/67 and 1977/78; it Is likely that wheat
output remained at best constant during this period.
Nearly all of Iran's rice is grown on the Caspian Sea litoral. Tradition­
ally, the country was an exporter of rice to the neighboring countries, includ 
ing Russia.^/ Even during the fifties, Iran was a net exporter of rice.
The turnabout was caused by the increase in demand and the substitution effect 
due to rising income. In the early sixties, per capita consumption of rice was 
about 20 Kgs. per year; by 1977/78 it had nearly doubled. Thus, given the mag­
nitude of the increase in population and demand, large quantities had to be im-
ported despite rising domestic output.
Imports of animal products increased substantially during the seventies.
At the relatively low level of per capita consumption, demand for animal pro­
ducts increased rapidly with rising incomes. It is interesting to note the in­
crease in imports of animal products was associated with a rapid rise in the im­
ports of feed grains. Clearly, the country's livestock sector was growing and
substituting imported feed for animal products.
Iran has been a traditional importer of sugar. Before the Bolshevik Revo­
lution, Russia was the main source of sugar. The first sugar factory was set up 
by the government in 1894 near Teheran. It operated for a brief period and suc­
cumbed to Russian competition. The 1930's saw the beginning of a modern sugar 
industry, and the late fifties and early sixties witnessed a feverish and rapid 
expansion of the industry. By the late 1960's, Iran was close to self-suffic­
iency in sugar, with imports representing no more than 10 percent of domest 
production (Table 5). The rise in the ratio of imports to production after 1972 
was not caused by falling output; it was caused by rising demand. Production of 
beet and cane sugar grew steadily up to 1976/77. In 1968/69 per capita sugar
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1967/68
1968/69
1969/70
1970/71
1971/72
1972/73
1973/74
1974/75
1975/76
1976/77
1977/78
SOURCE:
TABLE 5
PRODUCTION AND IMPORTS OF SUGAR 1967/68 - 1977/78
Domestic Output 
(000 tons)
Imports 
(000 tons)
Percent Of I 
Domestic Pr
415.3 202.7 48.8485.1 34.1 7.0512.1 66.0 12.9568.8 61.4 10.8585.7 87.5 10.1579.6 158.8 27.4608.5 286.0 47.0639.5 219.5 47.0665.9 596.4 89.7721.9 262.4 36.3632.3 447.5 70.7
Cereals, Tea, and Sugar Organization, Annual Reports on Output 
of Sugar Factories. Teheran. --------------- —
Foreign Trade Statistics of Iran, Annual Reports. Ministrv of 
Commerce, Teheran.
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consumption was 20.1 Kgs; in 1977/78 it had increased to 30.2 Kgs. Conse­
quently, with population increase, sugar requirements doubled in a decade.
One of the many problems created by inflation was the overvaluation of the 
Iranian currency, the rial, first, thanks to the rising petroleum revenues, 
there were no pressing balance of payments problems; in fact, the Central Bank 
was accumulating foreign reserves despite the large expenditure programs.
Second, overvaluation of the rial had no effect on petroleum exports since the 
latter were priced in dollars. Third, Iran imported large quantities of food, 
consumer items, as well as capital goods. Devaluation would have meant higher 
cost of imported goods, and a reduction in the pace of industrialization, and in 
the mechanization of domestic agriculture. In addition, devaluation would have 
further aggravated the inflation in the price of food items, especially given 
the inelastic demand in the short and medium terms. It was believed at the time 
that much of the inflation was caused by rising cost of imported products and a 
deterioration in the terms of trade.
The level of tariff protection given to the newborn domestic industries was 
sufficient to offset any exchange disadvantage. For example, the automobile 
industry was effectively shielded from foreign competition by a tariff wall that 
kept domestic prices substantially above foreign prices. However, given the 
rising demand for food and the growth of industry, erection of tariff walls 
around the agricultural sector was not in the realm of the practical.
Food prices were effectively checked through imports• By reducing the 
price of imports in terms of domestic currency and increasing the price of agri 
cultural exports in terms of foreign currencies, the overvalued rial reduced 
the competetiveness of agriculture. Demand for some of the traditional exports 
like cotton, hides and skins, and raisins is elastic because of numerous
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international competitors. A notable exception is the demand for Persian 
carpets. Because of reputation, taste factors, and the relative absence of 
effective substitutes, the demand for Persian rugs was relatively inelastic with 
respec t to price, a fact borne out by the behavior of the market during the 
decade of the seventies.
There is a substantial amount of misinformation and misconception on the 
issue of price protection. The reason appears to have been the governmentrs 
liberal import policies, subsidies on the price of essential goods like bread, 
sugar, cooking oils, and animal products, and the general attempt to check the 
rise in the price of food. In addition there was a failure to provide and 
widely disseminate price statistics. Wheat was the commodity most often cited 
for not having received adequate price protection. It was commonly believed 
that domestic wheat producers had received negative price protection, in other 
words, domestic wheat prices had been maintained below foreign prices. An 
examination of price statistics over the relevant period does not support the 
charge (Table 6). The only noteworthy case of negative protection were the 
years 1974/75 to 1976/77 when conditions on the international markets were 
unsettled because of a global food crisis. Even then, the average domestic 
wholesale price of wheat was not less than 85 percent of the cost, insurance, 
and freight (cif) price of imported wheat. In most years domestic prices were 
above import prices.
There was substantial government participation in the wheat market. It 
directly purchased a sizable fraction of the domestic output through the cooper­
ative networks;^/ furthermore, a government agency directly imported and 
marketed foreign wheat. From table 6 it is evident that government trading 
exerted a damper on annual price fluctuations. Secondly, domestic wheat prices
TABLE 6
1962/63
1963/64
1964/63
1965/66
1966/67
1967/68
1968/69
1969/70
1970/71
1971/72
1972/73
1973/74
1974/75
1975/76
1976/77
1977/78
SOURCE:
* Only
DOMESTIC: At® IMPORT PRICES OF WHEAT, 1962/63 - 1977/78
Average Domestic 
Wholesale Price 
3f Wheat (rial/kg)
Average 
Price cif
Import
(rial/kg)
Ratio of Domestic 
To Import Price
7.86 5.44 1.44
7.41 8.,87 0.83
7.95 5.,91 1.34
8. 33 4.,95 1.68
7. 38 5.,41 1.36
5. 98 ■ 5,,32 1.12
5. 52 "5,,26 1.04
6. 14 16.,47* .37
7. 68 7.,38 1.04
8,,40 5,.79 1.45
7.11 6..16 1.15
7.,92 6,.45 1.22
12.,58 14..73 .85
13.,40 15..75 .85
n ., a . 17 .62 —
12..60 11 .37 1.10
0. Aresvik, Agricultural Development in Iran, (Praeger Publishers, 
1976).
Foreign Trade Statistics of Iran, Annual Reports, Ministry of 
Commerce, Teheran.
499 tons were imported in that year.
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tended to stay in line with import prices. Indeed, this is not surprising; the 
yardstick used by the government in determining its purchase prices of wheats of 
varying qualities were the import prices. Exceptions did occur when low import 
levels and shortfalls in domestic production caused domestic prices to rise sub­
stantially above government price. In 1977/78, government prices were just 
under 13 rials per kilo, and were raised to 18 rials after the Revolution, 
market prices were in the region of 20 rials. Government policy regulated 
inter- and intra—seasonal variations in the price of wheat and kept domestic 
prices in line with import costs. There were several reasons why the government 
was not anxious to provide growers with significant protection. Bread is a sta­
ple in the Iranian diet, therefore higher prices and lower imports would have 
been a regressive measure, causing hardships to the urban poor. Secondly, sup­
ply elasticity for grains in the short run was small; reliable and adequate ex­
pansion in output had to come from irrigated land, and not from dryland wheat.
The main beneficiaries of higher wheat prices would not have been the small 
farmers since they produced relatively little surplus wheat and barley* Tradi­
tionally, bread prices in the urban areas were stabilized at a low level by 
means of a variable subsidy on the price of wheat. Urban millers purchased 
wheat at subsidized rates from a government agency, and in turn were obliged to 
sell flour to bakers at a set price. Higher wheat prices necessitated higher 
subsidies unless the retail price of bread was raised. However, bread was not
the only subsidized item; the list included sugar, vegetable fats, imported mut­
ton, chicken and dairy products.46/
For many items, government price supports were either unnecessary or irrel­
evant given domestic shortages. Fluid milk is such a product. Given little 
international trade in milk, farm and retail prices were kept high because of
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shortages. In its attempt to build and improve the domestic dairy herd, pedi­
gree cows were imported and sold to dairymen at subsidized rates. Rice and 
mutton provide further interesting examples. Because of consumer preferences, 
domestic varieties of rice and mutton sold at a large premium over imports. 
Consumers preferred domestic rice varieties which sold at twice the price of 
imported ones; similarly, because of taste and religious considerations domestic 
mutton sold at a high premium over imported "frozen" varieties. Needless to 
say, in the absence of imports, domestic prices would have been much higher.
The case of the sugarbeet industry illustrates some of the limitations of 
the agricultural price policies, and the main problems faced by the Iranian 
agriculture. Sugarbeets are grown throughout most of the country. It is a 
labor intensive crop, providing employment and income for a substantial number 
of rural inhabitants. Protection of the sugar industry had a dual purpose. It 
stimulated production and reduced reliance on imports; second, it provided addi­
tional employment and income to farmers and agricultural workers. The transpor­
tation industry was also a main beneficiary since each fall between four and
five million tons of beets were transported.
Traditionally, the marketing of sugar was highly regulated. All domestic 
processors were obliged to sell their output to the government at a set price; 
in addition, the government was the sole importer and distributor of foreign 
sugar. Retail prices were also set by the government. This arrangement was 
designed to protect domestic farmers and processors, stabilize retail prices, 
and provide the Treasury with revenue (Table 7). With the rising cost of 
imported sugar from 1972/73, the increased prices paid to producers, and a com­
mitment to stable retail prices in the face of rising per capita consumption, 
the sugar program became a heavy fiscal drain.
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TABLE 7
DOMESTIC AND IMPORT PRICE OF GRANULAR SUGAR 1971/72 - 1977/78
Price Paid to Domestic 
Factories rials/Kg
Average Import Price 
(cif) rials/Ke
1971/72 15.75 9.06
1972/73 15.75 12.52
1973/74 19.25 17.85
1974/75 25.50 43.70
1975/76 32.00 61.25
1976/77 35.50 64.56
1977/78 39.45 25.32
1978/79 43.85 16.09
SOURCE: m .G. Madjd. Navasanate Tolid Chogandar Ghand-e- Iran, Plan and
Budget Organization, Teheran, Azar 1359 (1981). (Instability in 
the Production of Sugarbeets in Iran)
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In addition to favorable prices, few crops offered the marketing and insti­
tutional advantages of growing sugarbeets. The price of the crop was known 
prior to planting and it was specified in a contract drawn between the farmer 
and the processor. The factories supplied the farmers with the necessary 
credits of cash and other inputs at a nominal rate of interest. These arrange­
ments were especially effective in helping small farmers to plant, harvest and 
transport the crop; without these advances, many small farmers could not have 
planted sugarbeets. In addition, longer term government capital to sugarbeet 
farmers was made available through the sugar processors.il/
Not surprisingly, there was a gradual increase in sugarbeet output during 
most of the decade. But production fell noticeably in 1977/78, the year before 
the Revolution. A main reason for the decline in output was the rise in labor 
and transportation costs. It was argued that agricultural wages and urban con­
struction wages were linked since rising urban construction wages drew labor 
from the farming sector, thereby increasing rural wages. Assuming similar 
trends were maintained in rural and urban wages, sugarbeet prices and wages 
stayed in line up to 1974/75 (Table 8). A marked divergence appears after that
year; while sugarbeet prices increased 62.3 percent in the proceeding years,
48 /average labor costs rose by 173.2 percent.— '
Given the relatively short harvest and the perishable nature of the pro­
duct, an economic and timely transportation of the crop is extremely important. 
During the late sixties and early seventies, trucking rates had typically varied 
between 180 and 400 rials per ton, depending on distance and road conditions. 
With growing demand for transportation space caused by the booming economic 
conditions, the increase in the number of sugarbeet producers and total output, 
transportation rates rose rapidly after 1974. During the 1976/77 harvest,
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TABLE 8
COMPARISON OF SUGARBEET OUTPUT, PRICES, AND LABOUR COSTS 
__________ :_________ _ ____________ 1969/70 - 1977/78
Index of UrbaiTotal Output Index of Sugarbeet Construction(million tons) Prices Labour Costs
1969/70 3.48 59.2 43.4
1970/71 3.85 59.3 51.9
1971/72 3.96 61.5 55.4
1972/73 3.92 63.8 65.0
1973/74 4.23 71.7 75.8
1974/75 4.12 100.0 100.0
1975/76 4.59 136.9 151.4
1976/77 5.27 152.1 204.3
1977/78 4.18 162.3 273.2
SOURCE: M.G. Madjd, Policies Concerning Sugar Production in Iran.1978, Ph.D. Thesis, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York.
Central Bank of Iran , Annual Reports.
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competition between the farmers drove transportation rates to as high as 900 
rials per ton for relatively short distances. This was equivalent to one-third
of the factory-gate price of sugarbeet.
In response to rising labor costs, a substantial number of producers aband­
oned sugarbeets despite the market and institutional advantages of growing the 
crop .49/ The relatively high levels of protection given the sugarbeet in­
dustry were not sufficient to offset the structural problems of the industry.
The vast majority of the farms were too small for efficient mechanization; 
indeed, meaningful mechanization in the small farms was not possible, and the 
larger units were not able to raise mechanization in a relatively short period.
Moreover, it can be asked if significant additional protection provided a 
long-range solution to the structural problems of sugarbeet farming. Past ex­
perience had shown that price increases were quickly overtaken by the rising 
labor costs. The levels of price protection required to ensure maintenance of 
some parity between prices and costs could not have been easily justified in 
terms of economic efficiency or equity. Sugar production represented a small 
part of the agricultural sector. While it was practical to afford special 
protection to selected crops, the conflicting constraints and limitations placed 
on the government were amply illustrated in the case of the exchange rate and to 
some extent by the price of wheat.
In an attempt to combat inflation in the years preceeding the Revolution, 
direct attempts were made at controlling the price of fruits and vegetables, as 
well as some non-perishable goods by attacking profiteering and hoarding.
In practice, it meant fining retailers, and to a lesser extent wholeslaers for 
"overcharging." Much more drastic measures were administered after the Revolu­
tion for "hoarding" and "profiteering." These measures were not only
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ineffective in raising supplies and reducing prices, they interfered with effec­
tive functioning of markets and price mechanisms. In its drive against "hoard­
ing, the government actually impeded the storage of products needed for contin­
uous use over time, and the role of price in the temporal allocation of consump­
tion. The attack on the retailers was particularly misplaced because of the 
competitiveness of the market, the perishability of fruits and vegetables, and 
the absence of high entry barriers. Traditionally, the urban wholesale fruit 
and vegetable markets (maidan) were controlled by relatively few and powerful 
wholesalers who exercised market power against retailers and the small vegetable 
and fruit farmers. In addition, producer prices were affected by the low stand­
ards of grading and packaging that resulted in damage to the product on the way 
to the market.
Concerning the allocations of capital to agriculture, with rising labor 
costs, a distorted land market, declining terms of trade for farm products, and 
the high rate of return to capital outside agriculture, it was not surprising 
that agriculture could not compete successfully for the supply of private funds. 
Consequently, adequate provision of subsidized capital became vital to the 
growth and development of the agricultural sector. Government credit to agri­
culture was channeled mainly through two publicly owned banks. The Agricultural 
Cooperative Bank supplied the nationwide network of rural cooperatives with 
loanable funds for members; the Agricultural Development Bank of Iran (ADEI) was 
instrumental in transferring government and to a lesser extent foreign capital 
into agribusiness and commercial ventures.
It was seen above that membership of rural -cooperatives was required of 
those receiving land under the land reforms; the cooperatives were intended to 
serve the needs of the new owner cultivators, and in particular, provide credit
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and subsidized inputs. Under the old system, a vital role of the landlord was 
provision of interest free and timely credit for both production and consumption 
needs of the peasants.50/ The land reform attempted to replace this tradi­
tional and decentralized system with a central one. It was noted above that, 
from the beginning, the cooperative system was hampered by a severe shortage of 
resources, and especially qualified personnel. Membership of the cooperatives 
grew steadily, and in 1977/78 over three million producers belonged to rural co­
operatives (Table 9). On the eve of the Revolution, nearly 85 percent of the 
villages were covered by the cooperatives. The total amount of loans provided 
by the cooperatives grew from 10.0 billion rials ($143.9 million) in 1972/73 to 
30.1 billion rials ($430 million) in 1977/78. The number of loan recipients per 
year varied between 1.1 and 1.4 millions or about one.half of the membership. 
Average loan size increased from 8650 rials ($122.7) in 1972/73, to 22,800 rials 
($323.4) in 1977/78.
It is evident the small farmers were not the recipients of government gen­
erosity. In fairness, it should be stressed that the cooperative networks, hav­
ing gotten off to a difficult start, were still in relative infancy, and were in 
the process of expansion. The average credit given to a farmer contributed to 
the out of pocket expenses of plantings and harvest in a given year, but was not 
sufficient to allow capital improvements. It is believed that the Cooperative 
Bank was unhappy with the repayment record of its borrowers as many continued to 
borrow in order to meet their existing obligations. It was rumored that some of 
the loans were spent on consumer durables. The Bank was in a relatively weak 
position, since in practice, it could not foreclose the newly created small 
owner cultivators. There was much talk after the Revolution of a moratorium on 
all debts owed by the small farmers.
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The other government agricultural credit institution was the ADBI. There 
was a significant increase in importance of this bank as a source of credit 
(Table 10). The amount of credit and outright aid approved by the Bank rose 
from 1.3 billion rials ($18.4 million) in 1971/72 to 25.8 billion rials ($368.6 
million) in 1976/77, having reached a peak of 48.6 billion rials ($694.3 
million) in 1975/76. The Bank participated in large capital intensive projects, 
and its participation rate was nearly 50 percent of the total investment per 
project, including the value of the land. Given that even a large proportion of 
commercial farms lacked property deeds, despite certification from land reform 
authorities, the Bank showed little flexibility on the acceptability of 
documents. Furthermore, the work of the Bank was often hampered by the refusal 
of the Ministry of Water and Power to grant permits for installation of new
51/irrigation sources • d t ! .
Included in the figures for total credit and aid are the amounts paid out 
by the Bank to the unsuccessful agribusiness ventures in Kuzestan. Most of 
these projects were initially set up with foreign capital and management partic- 
ipation.52/ yith lack of commercial and economic success the foreign par- 
ticipants withdrew and the ADBI was obliged to take over the shares and active 
management of the concerns. Most of the ventures became bottomless pits for 
government money; the successful ones like the sugar cane project at Daimcheh, 
and the much older one at Haft Tapeh, were to be plagued by poor labor rela­
tions. Most of the agribusinesses were dissolved after the Revolution and the 
lands were divided between the former cultivators and the employees who happened
to work on them.
Some seven remaining agribusinesses were located in the other provinces. 
Usually, they were food processors who directly produced some of their raw
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TABLE 10
PROVISION OF CREDIT BY THE AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT 
__________ BANK OF IRAN, 1971/72 - 1976/77
1971/72 1972/73 1973/74 1974/75 1975/76 1976/77
Number of Loan Appli-
cations Approved 69 159 309 534 682 580
Amount of Credit And 
Outright Aid Approved 
(million rials) 1301 1282 2560 17205 . 48600 25801
Average Credit and Aid 
Given Per Project 
(million rials) 18.8 8.0 8.2 32.2 71.2 44.4
Average Total Invest­
ment Per Project 
(million rials) 43.3 30.8 18.2 57.7 148.7 91.5
Percent of Bank Credit 
of Total Investment 43.5 26.1 45.4 55.7 47.9 48.5
SOURCE: Agricultural Development Bank of Iran, Annual Reports.
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material requirements. Among the private concerns, perhaps the most widely rec 
ognized were Yek-o-Yek in Fars and Chin-Chin in Khorassan. Both firms special­
ized in the processing and canning of fruits and vegetables. The country s lar­
gest sugar mill, located in Shirvan, in northern Khorassan, produced a substan­
tial part of its sugarbeet consumption.
Among the government concerns were the Fars Meat Complex near Shiraz,
Dashte Moghan in Azarbaijan, and Ziaran Feedlot near Ghazvin. The Fars Meat 
Complex stood as a monument to the folly of the Ministry of Agriculture, and the 
waste of scarce resources by the government. The complex, costing over $50 mil­
lion, was a fully integrated processing facility. It was built to procure 
underfed livestock from the nearby tribal peoples, fatten the animals, slaugh­
ter , grade and market the products. It turned out that the only animals it 
could procure were live sheep imported from Australia. Consequently, the com 
plex remained idle.
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CONCLUSION
The land reforms fundamentally changed the structure and organization of 
the Iranian agriculture. The magnitude of the measure is reflected in the num­
bers involved: some 3 million cultivators received land, and the number of
landowners affected was in excess of 230,000. In addition to the structural 
changes, the reforms altered the traditional notion of landownership. The cust- 
omery and widespread concept of landownership involved rights and privileges in 
exchange for certain obligations, and was to a lesser extent concerned with the 
actual physical possession of the land. The same pattern was exhibited in the 
workings of the bonehs. The land reforms changed this into a system of small 
owner cultivators.
The reforms were carried out in three phases. Shortly before the comple­
tion of the measures in the early seventies, there was a dramatic rise in the 
imports of agricultural products. Considering wheat, the most important crop, 
average annual imports were 830,000 tons for the period 1971 to 1973, compared 
to an average of 186,000 tons for the previous three years. There was a further 
increase in the import levels following the increase in the price of petroleum. 
Average annual import for the period 1974 to 1977 was 1.1 million tons. More 
spectacular was the rise in the imports of highly income elastic commodities 
like rice, animal products and sugar.
Although, the land reforms caused some disruption in the production of 
grains, there is little evidence that they brought about drastic reductions in 
the supply of agricultural products. Shortly after having undergone profound 
changes, Iranian agriculture had to adapt to the new circumstances following the 
rise in petroleum income. Associated with the latter were increased urban
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employment opportunities, expanding demand for food, and changes in the level of 
comparative costs and advantages. A consequence of the land reform was that it 
made the country’s agriculture singularly ill-prepared to- make the necessary ad­
justments and meet the new market conditions. In a country that had been accus­
tomed to self-sufficiency in food, the mounting import levels gave rise to much
consternation and criticism.
In the search for the causes of the Revolution, there has been some anal­
ysis of the agricultural problems. It has been frequently argued that the 
reforms were not sufficiently radical, that is they covered only a small frac­
tion of the peasantry and an even smaller fraction of the cultivated
has also been frequently argued that there was a deliberate neglect of the agri­
cultural sector by the government after the land reforms; the failure to allo­
cate sufficient capital and provide adequate price protection encouraged rural 
migration. Therefore, It is implied, if the land reforms had been more radical, 
and had the government supplied more capital to the rural cooperatives, and the 
price of wheat had been maintained at a higher level, events would have followed 
a different course.
It was seen that the commonly-held views of the land reforms have no foun-
. rt-F rVipse onlv serves to obscure thedation in realty, and the perpetuation of tnese oniy
issues. The subject of price policy and exchange rate were examined in some 
detail. Given the rapid increase in income, the expansion in non-agricultural 
employment opportunities, and the persistence of severe inflation, the effect­
iveness of conventional price and exchange policies and the ability of the gov 
ernment to use them were restricted. The limitations of the agricutural price
policies per se were illustrated in the case of sugarbeet production; price
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increases were soon overtaken by the rapid rise in the costs of production, es­
pecially labor and transportation costs. Moreover, the desperate and unsuc­
cessful attempt to control food prices through direct controls, and the attack
on retailers was a reminder of the limitations on the ability of the government 
to influence economic factors.
Government involvement in rural affairs expanded substantially with the 
land reforms; in practice the government attempted to provide some of the serv­
ices that had been traditionally fulfilled by the landlords. Historically, some 
segments of the Iranian bureaucracy had been involved in the administration of 
government-owned estates; however, the experience was usually confined to 'leas­
ing the land to individuals and collecting revenues. This limited involvement 
did not provide sufficient preparation to grasp and deal with the intricate 
problems of the rural sector.
The highly centralized system was ill-suited to the task, and the problems 
were compounded by the scarcity of data and trained manpower.' As a result of 
the land reforms, the government machinery was faced with tasks in which it had 
little prior experience or aptitude. Consequently, it was not surprising that 
the farm corporations were badly run, the rural cooperatives did not receive ad­
equate capital, and nearly one half of the membership of the cooperatives did 
not receive government supplied annual short-term credit and had to seek cost­
lier alternative sources. Moreover, government agencies were often caught i n a  
tangle of contradicting and conflicting regulations. The issue of title deeds 
was extremely important because of the large number of farmers affected, the 
fragmentation of land and the deleterious effects on investment in agriculture 
and farm consolidation. However, it turned out that the uncertainty generated 
concerning the ownership of land was as an effective measure to combat
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speculation in land and higher land prices. Thus, although the avowed policy 
was to encourage investment in agriculture through liberal provision of subsi 
dized government capital, most often farmers were barred because they lacked the
necessary papers. Often, those who qualified were faced with the strict zoning 
regulations of the Ministry of Water and Power, and the adamant refusal to per­
mit the installation of new irrigation sources. The restrictive policy with re­
spect to the exploitation of the aquifers ran counter to the attempt to increase
investment in agriculture.
The frequently stated claim that the government neglected agriculture tends 
to conceal the issue of extensive government involvement in agriculture which 
was a direct result of the land reforms and the accompanying legislation. It 
also tends to obscure the important conclusion to be drawn from the Iranian ex­
perience: Iran illustrated some of the unforeseen consequences of tampering
with and radically changing a well-established and ancient agricultural system 
in a short period. It is of interest to note that an Iranian-style land reform 
has been in progress in El Salvador. The measures, under United States spons­
orship, consist of three phases in which land is given to sharecroppers and ten­
ants: Under the first and the second phases, large and medium sized farms are 
turned into peasant cooperatives. The third phase allows tenants to apply for 
up to 17 acres of land. The success of the land reforms will be dependent m  
part on the workings of the cooperatives. Moreover, for a small country that is 
dependent on agricultural exports for its prosperity and growth, the economic 
and social consequences of a failure can be extremely serious.
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37. See the author's unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Policies concerning 
Sugar Production in Iran,. 1978, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York, Chapter
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38. The rapid expansion in rug weaving during the latter parts of the ■ 
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43. Foreign Trade Statistics of Iran. 
(1978/79)1 -------------------- Ministry of Commerce, Teheran, 1357
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designed to benefit large producers since the small farm units were too small to 
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gavbands supplied the advances." Safinejad, op. cit., page 138. Miller also 
noted the importane of landlords in the provision of credit. "Under the old
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tenant. As a consequence, the landlord would lend money at no interest or low 
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Miller, op. cit., page 495.
51. A highly illustrative case on the lack of flexibility of the ADBI is 
described in "Sheibani Feedlot", a case study prepared in 1975 by J. C. Fischer 
for the Iran Center for Management Studies. The case involved the,.re jection of ^ 
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